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Abstract 
Inconsistent findings on the effect of resource inequality from previous studies are explained 
by two properties ofheterogeneity: (1) level of inequality and (2) asymmetry of resource 
distribution. In two studies, we have confirmed that symmetric heterogeneous groups 
cooperate less than homogeneous groups. Moreover, the larger the inequality, the less the 
groups cooperate. Interestingly, the cooperation ofhegemonic distribution groups remains 
unchanged across inequality levels. We have also found that the contribution to the provision 
ofpublic goods can reduce the inequalities in symmetric heterogeneous groups but not in 
hegemonic distribution groups. The causes and the consequences of the phenomenon are 
discussed. Our study sheds light on the investigation of different types of resource inequality 
in public goods dilemma. 
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Effect of Inequality on Cooperation: 
Heterogeneity and Hegemony in Public Goods Dilemma 
There are both theoretical based researches (e.g. Bergstrom, Blume, & Varian, 1986; 
Warr, 1983) and experimental studies (e.g. Aquino, Steisel, & Kay, 1992; Chan, Mestelman, 
Moir, & Muller，1996; Cherry, Kroll, & Shogren，2005; Levati, Sutter, and Van Der Heijden, 
2007) that compare cooperation between groups with unequal resources in public goods 
• I 
dilemma (PGD) . Nevertheless, their findings do not converge. Some researchers (e.g. 
Aquino et al., 1992; Cherry et al., 2005) have found that heterogeneous groups, which 
members have endowments that are different from each other, cooperate less than 
homogeneous groups, which members have equal amounts ofendowment. Others (e.g. 
Bergstrom et al., 1986; Chan et al., 1996) argue the opposite and state that heterogeneity 
fosters cooperation. Yet, some (e.g. Levati et al., 2007; Warr, 1983) suggest that cooperation 
is invariant across different levels of inequality. To the best o fou r knowledge, the mentioned 
studies are the only ones that have made comparisons on cooperative behavior directly 
between heterogeneous and homogeneous groups in PGD. This study untangles the puzzle of 
these mixed evidences from previous findings by identifying two properties ofheterogeneity 
that have not been looked into in the same study before. They are the level ofheterogeneity 
and the asymmetry of distribution. In two experiments, we examine their effects on 
cooperation in PGD and discuss how they explain the inconsistencies in previous findings. 
Heterogeneity in Public Goods Dilemma 
Most o f the earlier researches on PGD studied homogeneous groups, in which 
resources are equally distributed (Rapoport, 1988; Van Lange，Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 
1992). It is not until more recent years has there been increasing focus on heterogeneous 
groups with members getting unequal amount ofresources (e.g. Buckley & Croson, 2006; 
‘A brief introduction ofPGD is summarized in Appendix A. 
Effect of Inequality on Cooperation 7 
Cress & Kimmerle, 2008; Isaac & Walker，1988; Marwell & Ames, 1979; Rapoport, 
Bornstein, & Erev，1989; Van Dijk & Grodzka, 1992; Van Dijk & Wilke，1994; Wit, Wilke, 
and Oppewal 1992). In homogeneous PGD studies, every member in a group has the same 
amount of endowment, the same impact on the PG for each unit of endowment they 
contribute, and they are rewarded by the same payoff function. In heterogeneous PGD studies, 
group members could be different in terms of their endowments (endowment asymmetry) or 
in terms of the rewards they could get (interest asymmetry) (Van Dijk, Wilke, & Metman， 
1999). Since most of the studies that compare between homogeneous and heterogeneous 
groups focus on endowment heterogeneity, we are concentrating on this type ofheterogeneity 
in this study. Marwell and Ames (1979, 1980) were the first to study the effect of 
heterogeneity in PGD. They suggested that people cooperated less when resources were not 
equally distributed. Economists including Warr (1982,1983) and Bergstrom, Blume, and 
Varian (1986) had also proposed theories to predict cooperation in such a dilemma situation. 
While Marwell and Ames (1979) suggested that heterogeneity undermined contribution to the 
PG, Warr (1983) argued, with economic theories, that contribution should be invariant as the 
inequality of the group change. Nevertheless, Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) had 
proposed their own model, the BBV model, and argued that heterogeneity fostered 
contribution. Since then, more and more experimental studies had been conducted to test 
these models. Most of them focused on heterogeneous groups. They investigated individual 
behaviors of the members in these groups and proposed factors to explain group and 
individual decisions in heterogeneity. A brief review of these factors can be found in 
Appendix B. Nevertheless, we must compare these two directly in order to analyze whether, 
and by how much, heterogeneous groups are behaviorally different from homogeneous 
groups. • 
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Homogeneity vs. Heterogeneity 
Only very few studies had attempted to make comparisons among different levels of 
heterogeneity experimentally. One of them was Aquino et al. (1992). They compared a 
heterogeneous group with large variance of endowment with another group with small 
variance (see Table 1). The four participants in their study experienced both conditions. They 
were randomly assigned to an endowment position, and were asked to decide simultaneously 
on the amount they would like to contribute to a business project. The two groups had the 
same total endowments and there was only one trial for each heterogeneous condition in the 
game. A PG oftwice the amount of the group contribution would be provisioned ifthe group 
contribution was over a certain amount (i.e. a step-level PG). Supporting their predictions, 
groups with small variance of endowment contributed more than their larger variance 
counterparts. They explained this discrepancy by the sucker effect motive of the high 
endowment positions, and the desire to free ride ofthe low endowment positions. 
Along the same line, a more recent study conducted by Cherry et al. (2005) also 
provided evidence that heterogeneity undermined contribution. Their focus, however, was put 
on individual rather than group contribution. In a single-trial simultaneous PG game, in 
which four players had to decide the amounts that they wanted to contribute for the linear PG. 
There were four homogeneous endowment conditions: [10, 10，10，10], [20，20，20，20], [30， 
30, 30, 30], and [40, 40，40, 40], as well as one heterogeneous condition: [10, 20，30, 40]. The 
players were randomly assigned to one of these five conditions. Cherry et al. compared the 
average contributions of individuals in homogeneous groups with those in heterogeneous 
groups. Consistent with Aquino et al.'s (1992) findings, players cooperated less when the 
members in their groups all had different endowments. These two studies gave strong support 
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On the other side of the argument, Bergstrom et al.'s (1986) BBV model was also 
supported by empirical research. In their attempt to verify the prediction of the BBV model, 
which said that more unequal distribution led to an increase o fPG provision, Chan et al. 
(1996) carried out an experiment and had their participants play 15 trials o f P G game in 
unchanged groups of three members with unchanged endowments and a non-linear payoff 
function. Similar to Aquino et al. and Cherry et al.'s paradigms, the players made decisions 
simultaneously on the amount of contribution. The endowments in the homogeneous 
condition and the four heterogeneous conditions are described in Table 1. The variance ofthe 
endowments was larger in the higher levels ofheterogeneity, but the total group endowments 
remained the same across conditions. Their results were complicated. First ofall, Chan et al. 
acknowledged that the BBV model was supported by their data at group level but not at 
individual level. Then they also pointed out that when the variance of endowments was small, 
group contributions did not deviate from homogeneous groups. This finding agreed with 
Warr's (1983) prediction. When the variance was large, however, group contributions 
increased, which contradicted with Aquino et al. (1992) and Cherry et al. (2005) studies. 
Based on these results, it appeared that the relation between the variance of endowment and 
contribution was not as simple as Aquino et al. predicted. 
Also supporting Warr's prediction was the study conducted by Levati et al. (2007). 
Although their focus was on the impact of leader in heterogeneous PG dilemma, they had 
also compared the cooperation rate in their control condition (i.e. without a leader) with a 
comparable homogeneous condition in another study by Guth, Werner, Levati, Sutter, and 
Van der Heijden (2007) as illustrated in Table 1. In the control condition of Levati et al.'s 
experiment, four players, two with $20 and two with $30, decided simultaneously the 
amounts of contribution to a linear PG over multiple trials. Similar setting was used in the 
control condition of Guth et al.'s (2007) study, except that all participants in Guth et al's 
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experiment had an endowment of $25. The result of comparison between these two studies 
was that cooperation was invariant between homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. 
It is interesting that Levati et al.'s (2007) results support both Warr's (1983) theory 
and Chan et al's small heterogeneity conditions, yet the results of the large heterogeneity 
conditions of Chan et al. contradict with Aquino et al.'s (1992) and Cherry et al.'s (2005). It 
seems like the findings for heterogeneity with small endowment variance are more consistent 
across studies, while the findings for those with large variance go in opposite directions in 
some studies. Variance of endowment within a group, as suggested by Aquino et al. (1992), 
could be a good candidate to explain the discrepancies among these studies. 
Concepts of Heterogeneity and Asymmetry of Resource Distribution 
Aquino et al. (1992) used variance to define the two levels of inequality in their 
studies. Others did not emphasize the variance of the endowments in their heterogeneous 
conditions because they compared between homogeneous and only one configuration of 
heterogeneous groups. Moreover, as we mentioned, the resource distribution of Chan et al.'s 
(1996) conditions was also different from, but not captured by other studies. Since we are 
investigating cooperation of these various types of heterogeneous groups, it is important that 
we define the different types of resource distribution, and quantify the level of inequality. We 
use Figure 1 to help us illustrate our definition of these concepts. 
• 
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Fig. 1. Relations among Homogeneity, Symmetric Heterogeneity and Hegemony. Names with asterisk (*) are 
the conditions we examine in this study. 
Heterogeneity Quantified by Gini Coefficient. We defme level of inequality as the 
variability of the endowments in a group. When every member gets the same endowment, 
there is no endowment variability, and the group is said to be a homogeneous group (the top-
most level in Figure 1). High level of inequality refers to the situation where members' 
endowments are very different from each other. We borrowed the Gini coefficient (GC), 
which is one of the summary statistics for describing the distribution of income and wealth 
(Atkinson, 1975)，to represent the variability of endowments owned by group members. The 
GC is sensitive to resource transfer, which is one of our interests in this study. It also presents 
in a zero to one index that is comparable to groups of any size with magnitude of resources 
• 2 
measured in any scale . GC is also widely used in the real-world for describing the 
distribution of income and wealth of a society (The World Factbook, 2010). The larger is the 
2 There are many choices ofsummary statistics that can describe resource distribution of a group. Some other 
popular ones are range, variance, and logarithmic variance. Range is only sensitive to the two most extreme 
values of a distribution 'as it measures the distance between them and ignore what is in between. Variance and 
logarithmic variance measure the average distance between the mean and individuals' endowments. Variance 
has an obvious drawback ofbeing scale dependent. Although logarithmic variance overcomes this problem, 
both of the variance measures are not sensitive to resource transfer from the rich to the poor (Cowell, 1995). We 
chose GC because it does not have the mentioned drawbacks. 
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GC, the larger is the inequality in the group or society. Figure 1 demonstrates the difference 
between homogeneity and heterogeneity by the GC. Homogeneous groups always have zero 
GC, while heterogeneous groups have their GCs range from anything larger than zero to one 
depending on their levels of inequality. 
Asymmetry of Resource Distribution Defined by Skewness. Level of inequality alone 
does not tell us the distribution of the resources. The same level of inequality could be 
distributed symmetrically or asymmetrically in the group (the second level in Figure 1). 
Symmetric heterogeneity is represented by zero skewness, which means that the shape of the 
distribution is symmetric. For example, a group with endowments of [15, 30, 45] and another 
group with endowments of [25, 30, 35] are both symmetric heterogeneous groups. On the 
other hand, asymmetric heterogeneous groups have relatively more high endowments or low 
endowments, which give the absolute value of skewness larger than zero. For example, group 
[20, 20, 50] and group [10, 10, 70] both have two small and one large endowments. These 
two groups have the same skewness but their levels of inequality, represented by GCs, are 
different, with the latter being more unequal than the former. Thus, the level of inequality can 
be changed with the skewness remain constant. Two groups can also be at the same level of 
inequality but with different types of distribution. For example, group [20, 20, 50] and [15, 30, 
45] have the same inequality level but the distribution of the former is asymmetric while that 
of the latter is symmetric. In other words, the level of inequality and the asymmetry of 
distribution may vary independently^. The asymmetric distribution of a heterogeneous group 
can be skewed to high endowment or to low endowment (the bottom level of Figure 1). In 
this study, we focus only on the asymmetric groups that skew to high endowment, and named 
this distribution as "hegemony". Hegemony is defined as "preponderant influence or ‘ 
authority over others", or "the social... or economic influence exerted by a dominant group" 
3 Although we can manipulate inequality and asymmetry independently, these two factors are not orthogonal as 
the asymmetry (skewness) of a distribution is undefined when the resources are all equal to each other (GC = 0). 
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("Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary", 2010). Heterogeneous groups with hegemonic 
distribution are compared with those with symmetric distribution as well as with those with 
homogeneous endowments on their cooperation rate in this study. 
Level of Inequality on Cooperation 
According to Table 1, the heterogeneous conditions that showed different cooperation 
rate from the homogeneous conditions all had relatively high levels of inequality represented 
by high GCs. The conditions with lower GCs, on the other hand, did not behave differently 
from the homogeneous conditions, as well as from each other. Both condition [70000, 66000， 
14000，10000], which was the high inequality condition in Aquino et al., and condition [10, 
20, 30, 40], which was the only heterogeneous condition in Cherry et al., cooperated less than 
the homogeneous conditions in their respective studies. But at the same time, conditions [12, 
12, 36] and [9，9, 42], which were the largest two heterogeneous conditions in Chan et al. 
actually cooperated more than the homogeneous condition. Although the GCs of these two 
conditions were very close to [70000, 66000, 14000, 10000] and [10, 20，30，30], their 
cooperation rates went in opposite direction when compared with their homogeneous 
counterparts. That indicates that we cannot predict cooperation simply based on the level of 
inequality of the groups. However, if we consider Chan et al.'s heterogeneous conditions 
separately because their heterogeneous groups are all hegemony while others are all 
symmetric heterogeneity, then we are able to have a clearer picture about the effect of the 
level of inequality. That is, as the level of inequality increases, cooperation rate decreases. 
Distribution of Resources in Heterogeneous Group 
All the heterogeneous groups of Chan et al. are hegemonic distributions. The 
cooperation rates of these groups increase as the level of inequality increases. Chan et al. 
explained their findings by claiming that the low endowed members over-contributed, while 
the high endowed members under-contributed to the PG relative to the prediction ofBBV 
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model. We speculate that, although the high endowed members in hegemonic groups under-
contributed according to BBV, they might still have a greater sense of self-efficacy and 
responsibility on the welfare of the group than those in the symmetric heterogeneous groups, 
because of their ownership of the significantly large quantity of the endowment compared 
with others. In fact, a recent study conducted by McCarter，Budescu and Schreffran (2010) on 
give-some-take-some dilemma showed evidence supporting our speculation. Although their 
participants were allowed to choose between contributing and harvesting of resources in their 
paradigm, the results showed that the high endowed members tended to contribute more 
when the low endowed members are the majority and the high endowed members are the 
minority. They suggested that in this situation, coordination of actions was the most efficient, 
and the loss aversion of high endowed members was minimized. It could be because of the 
same reason that the two highest inequality groups in Chan et al.'s experiment contributed 
greater amounts than their homogeneous counterparts. 
Two Properties of Heterogeneity 
By now, we have identified two properties of heterogeneity that affect cooperation. 
They are the level of inequality, as defined by the endowment variability in a group, and the 
hegemonic distribution of the endowments, as defined by the asymmetric distribution with a 
uniquely large endowment. Higher level of inequality leads to lower cooperation rate in 
symmetric heterogeneous groups, whereas higher level of inequality can lead to higher 
cooperation rate in hegemonic distribution groups. 
We conducted two studies to examine the effects of these two properties on 
cooperation. The purpose of the first study was to replicate Cherry et al.'s (2005) results with 
our paradigm, which was a multiple-trial PG game that involved groups of three and four. We 
chose Cherry et al.'s study to replicate because we noticed that the group endowments of 
their conditions were not equal, while others' conditions all had the same group endowments 
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(see Table 1). We wanted to replicate it with our paradigm in order to eliminate this possible 
confounding factor. In Study 2, we tested the effect of changing the heterogeneity levels on 
cooperation rate, as well as how this effect in the symmetric heterogeneous groups differed 
from the asymmetric hegemonic groups. We also explored where this difference came from, 
and the consequence of such difference in terms of resource redistribution of the groups. 
Study 1 
The purpose of this study was to replicate Cherry et al.'s (2005) findings in a 
multiple-trial PGD with equal group endowment. Cherry et al.'s groups in their experiment 
had total endowments different from each other. For example, the [10，20, 30, 40] condition 
had a total oflOO units, while [40, 40, 40，40] had a total o f l 6 0 units (see Table 1). It was 
possible that the differences of contribution found among these conditions were not only due 
to the distribution of endowments, but also the difference in collective incentive. Researches 
had shown that the contribution to the PG was positively affected by the attractiveness of the 
incentive (Bell, Petersen, & Hautaluoma, 1989). However, although the amounts of collective 
reward were different among Cherry et al's conditions, the Marginal Per Capita Return 
(MPCR), which represented the return that each member got from a unit contribution by any 
group member, was the same for all members across conditions (MPCR = 0.5). This made 
their reward scheme equivalent (Isaac, Walker, & Thomas，1984). Therefore, we predict that 
the same pattem of findings as Cherry et al.'s can be found in our paradigm. 
Method 
The Design of the Present Study 
The experiment included two types of group configurations: (1) homogeneous groups 
with equal endowments, (2) heterogeneous groups with different but symmetrically 
distributed endowments, and two group sizes: (1) three-person groups and (2) four-person 
groups. In this experiment, there was only one heterogeneous configuration in each group 
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size condition, while there was more than one type ofhomogeneous conditions in the three-
and four-person groups. All the conditions are listed in Table 2. 
The PG paradigm was a multiple-trial game with continuous contribution and linear 
payoff function. The game was framed as an investment. Participants decided simultaneously 
and anonymously the amount to invest to the group public account in each trial. Each trial 
represented one of the conditions described in Table 2. The order of the trials for the two 
group sizes was counterbalanced, and the order of the trials within each group size condition 
was randomized. Each trial was made independent by assigning players to play with different 
combinations of other participants with different amounts of endowment in each trial. 
Participants were given two practice trials before the actual game started in order to give 
them the opportunity to get familiar with the game. They were ensured that their 
performances in the practice trials would not affect their bonuses of the game. 
A manipulation check question was asked right after the investment decision was made for 
checking participants' perception of endowment heterogeneity within their groups. It was 
asked only in the first trial and in the trial that group size changed, namely the seventh trial or 
the ninth trial, depending on whether three- or four-person groups started fwsX.Homogeneous 
and Heterogeneous Conditions 
All conditions that the participants experienced were listed in Table 2. Conditions [10, 
10，10，10] to [10，20，30，40] were the exact same conditions used in Cherry et al.'s 
experiment, and conditions [20, 20, 20] to [20, 30, 40] were our designs for generalizing the 
findings to three-person groups. Two of these three-person group conditions were designed to 
eliminate the confounding factor of unequal group endowments. They were condition [30，30， 
30] and [20, 30, 40] as both of them had a total group endowment of 90. For the purpose of 
keeping a balanced number of cases for each endowment, condition [20，30，40] was 
designed to appear in the experiment three times (i.e. occupying three of the trials). For the 
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same reason, condition [10, 20，30, 40] appeared in four trials of the game to make the 
number of cases balanced for endowment 10, 20, 30 and 40. 
Participants and Design 
The experiment was a 2 (homogeneous vs. heterogeneous) configuration X 3 (high vs. 
medium vs. low) endowment status X 2 (four vs. three) group size within-subject design. It 
was not full factorial as there was no high or low endowment in homogeneous configurations. 
We had 72 college students ofThe Chinese University ofHong Kong participated in 
the experiment either at an hourly rate of HKD50 (-USD6.42) or as partial fulfillments of 
course credits. In each one-hour experimental session, 24 participants were arranged into 
groups of three and four. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to play in all the 
three-person group trials first; the other half played in all four-person group trials first. The 
two halves of participants never interacted with each other. 
Materials 
The PG game was a computer program implemented with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), 
which was a software that allowed participants play PG games over a computer network. The 
manipulation check question we asked during the game was, "In this investment, how much 
is your endowment different from others in your group". Participants responded on a seven-
point scale to indicate that they had 1 = "much less than others" to 7 = "much more than 
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Procedure 
After all the participants read and signed the informed consent form, the experimenter 
described the rundown of the experiment, and explained PGD with examples similar to the 
actual experimental conditions. The participants then took a quiz to make sure that they 
understood the calculations involved. Finally, the experimenter demonstrated the computer 
PG game by going through its screenshots. 
When introducing the PG game, the experimenter told them that they were going to 
play 10 to 20 trials of investment games, instead of the actual 14 trials to avoid the end game 
effect (Andreoni, 1988). In each game, they played with two or three other randomly selected 
participants in a room over the computer network. In each investment trial, they were given 
an amount of endowment based on the group configuration in that trial. Participants were 
aware that their endowments could be any amount, from a minimum of $ 10 to a maximum of 
$40, and were assigned to them randomly in every trial. The computer showed the 
endowments assigned to each of the three or four members. Then, for some ofthe trials, the 
participants were prompted to answer the manipulation check question. In all trials, they were 
told that each trial was an independent investment game, and were asked to decide without 
discussing with others how much they wanted to allocate to the public account (i.e. contribute 
to the PG) from their endowments, and how much they wanted to keep for themselves. 
Participants were informed that the final amount in the public account would be multiplied by 
a factor of 2.5, and this product would then be equally divided among their group members in 
that trial. When a trial was over and the payoffs had been calculated, the following 
information would be shown to the players: (1) original own endowment, (2) group 
endowment, (3) total group investment in public account, (4) own investment, (5) total group 
payoff, and (6) own payoff. Afterwards, they were assigned to another group with the other 
two or three randomly selected participants and played the next trial. 
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In order to encourage the participants to make the investment decisions seriously, 
there was a lucky draw at the end of the experiment, in which one of the 24 participants in 
each session would receive monetary rewards equivalent to the amounts of the payoff they 
had earned in one of the trials. The average reward was HKD93 (-USD12). At the end of the 
experiments, all participants were debriefed, paid and thanked. 
Results 
Manipulation check 
Participants responded on a seven-point scale, how much their endowments were 
different from others in their group to verify that our group heterogeneity manipulation was 
effective. They indicated that their endowment was 1 = much less than other to 7 = much 
more than others. We expected that the high endowed group members perceived themselves 
having more endowment when they were in heterogeneous groups than in homogeneous 
groups; and the low endowed members perceived having less endowment in heterogeneous 
groups than in homogeneous groups. We analyzed participants' responses separately for each 
group size. In this analysis, the behaviors of the participants were independent despite our 
design being within-subject. This is because the manipulation check question was asked only 
once in each of the four-person and three-person group conditions to each participant. 
For four-person groups, we coded endowments $30 and $40 as high endowments; $10 
and $20 as low endowments. ANOVA revealed an interaction effect of configuration 
(homogeneous vs. heterogeneous) and endowment status (high vs. low) on the manipulation 
check question, F(l, 68) = 12.65,j^ = .001, r|p^ = .16. Simple effect analysis confirmed that 
the low endowed members perceived their endowments as being less in heterogeneous (M = 
2.75, SD = .30) than in homogeneous groups (M= 4.0, SD = .43), F(1, 68) = 5.74,/? = .019," 
r|p2 = .08，while the high endowed members perceived theirs as being more in heterogeneous 
groups {Mheter = 5.21, SD = .30 vs. Mhomo = 3.83，SD = .43)，F(1, 68) = 6.94,ja= .01, r|p^ = .09. 
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For three-person groups, we coded endowment $40 as high endowment and $20 as 
low endowment. Contrary to our expectation, there was no significant configuration by 
endowment status interaction effect, F(1, 52) = 1.54, n.s., or configuration main effect, F(1, 
52) = .57, n.s., V[p = .01. 
Despite the insignificant manipulation check results in three-person groups, we 
considered our manipulation successful because participants could tell the difference when 
they were in four-person groups. One plausible explanation of the insignificant results in 
three-person groups would be that the difference between high and low endowments was not 
salient enough. We will go back to this issue in Study 2. 
Confirmation of Cherry et al. 's findings 
We expected to replicate Cherry et al.'s (2005) findings regarding the contribution 
differences between heterogeneous and homogeneous groups in our paradigm. Specifically, 
we anticipated to see higher average individual contributions, both in terms of absolute and 
relative values, in homogeneous than in heterogeneous four-person groups. Two repeated 
measure analyses were conducted to test the effects ofheterogeneity configuration and group 
size order. The results in terms of the absolute value of contribution showed a configuration 
X order interaction effect, F{\, 70) = 5A2,p = .023, r|p^ = .07, but no main effect on 
/ ^ 
configuration, F(1, 70) = 2.76, n.s., r|p = .04. Simple effect analysis further indicated that 
individuals contributed more in homogeneous group (M= 9.99，SD = 1.12) than in 
heterogeneous groups {M= 7.65, SD = 1.02) only when they played in four-person groups 
first, F(1, 70) = 7.95,/7= .006, r|p^ = .10. The analysis results were similar, but weaker, when 
the dependent measure was the percentage of endowment contributed. Although not 
significant, a trend of interaction effect between configuration and order was found, F(1, 70) 
=3.50,p = .066, r|p2 = .05. Individuals who played in four-person groups first contributed 
higher percentages of their endowments in homogeneous groups (M= 40%, SD = 5%) than in 
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heterogeneous groups {M= 33%, SD = 4%), F(1, 70) = 4.86,p = .031, r|p^ = .07. Same as the 
results on absolute value contribution, there was no heterogeneity configuration main effect 
for relative contribution, F(1, 70) = 1.55, n.s., r|p^ = .02. The means and standard deviations 
in absolute values and in percentage of endowment are listed in Table 3 and 4 respectively. 
Although the contribution differences between the two types of configuration 
emerged only when four-person groups played first, these results were still consistent with 
those of Cherry et al., because they only had four-person groups in their study. Thus, we were 
confident that the results found in our paradigm were comparable with Cherry et al.'s. 
Eliminating Unequal Group Endowments 
The other purpose of this study was to eliminate the possible confounding factor of 
unequal group endowment. In our three-person groups, two configurations, [30, 30, 30] and 
[20, 30，40] had the same group endowment of$90. If the homogeneous condition [30, 30，30] 
contributed more than the heterogeneous condition [20, 30, 40], then we could claim that the 
contribution difference found between homogeneous and heterogeneous groups in Cherry et 
al.'s study was not due to unequal group endowments. Contrary to our expectation, repeated 
measure analysis did not show cooperation difference between the two groups, (M[3o, 30,30]= 
9.07，SD = 9.22 vs. M[2o, 30,4o] = 10.27, SD = 7.98), F(1, 70) = 2.66, n.s., r|p^ = .04. The 
difference did not emerge either when we looked at the interaction between configuration and 
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Discussion 
We replicated the findings in Cherry et al. (2005) successfully in four-person groups. 
Individuals contributed more when everyone in their groups owned the same amount (i.e. 
homogeneous condition) than when they had different amounts of endowment (i.e. 
heterogeneous condition). However, this effect appeared to be quite sensitive to group size 
and the order of the group size arrangement. It emerged only in four-person groups and when 
four-person groups went first. Nevertheless, we were convinced that our paradigm was able 
to induce perceived heterogeneity and the corresponding behavioral changes on cooperation. 
Thus, we were confident to use it in Study 2 for more in-depth investigation on the levels 
inequality and the asymmetry of distribution. Detailed analyses for explaining the effects of 
group size and group size arrangement can be found in Appendix C. 
Study 2 
Hypotheses for Level of Inequality 
Aquino et al. (1992) proposed that, in a group of unequal endowment distribution, the 
high endowed members have both the fear ofbeing suckered by lower endowed members as 
well as the temptation to free-ride on higher or similarly high endowment positions. When 
there is no or very little endowment difference in the group, both the fear and the temptation 
should be minimized, because these motives are less salient. Although people with high 
endowments generally have higher senses of self-efficacy (Kerr, 1992) and responsibility for 
the collective welfare (Fleishman, 1980), those in heterogeneous groups with symmetric 
distributions may not have as strong feelings on these factors as those in homogeneous 
groups. They may not feel very efficacious because there are other members who also own 
similar amount of resources. They may also diffuse responsibility to other members with 
similar endowments (Diekmann, 1993; Latane & Rodin, 1969). Since for high endowed 
members, motives like the fear ofbeing suckered and the temptation to free-ride which 
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undermine contributions are more salient, while motives like self-efficacy and responsibility 
which foster contributions are less salient in more heterogeneous than in less heterogeneous 
groups, we agree with Aquino et al. (1992), and hypothesize that: 
H1: Homogeneous groups cooperate more than symmetric heterogeneous groups. 
H2: As the inequality in a group, which is represented by the GC in our study, 
increases, cooperation decreases. 
Hypotheses for Asymmetry of Distribution 
The high endowed members in groups with hegemonic distribution are the only 
members in their groups with unique endowments. Therefore, they have even higher self-
efficacy than those in the symmetric heterogeneous groups. As discussed in previous sections, 
one feels more responsible for the welfare of the group when other group members are 
perceived to have rather less resources (Van Dijk & Grodzka, 1992). The rules of distributive 
justice (Adams, 1965; Deutsch, 1975) also state that people find it fair to help those in needs. 
The high endowed members in hegemonic distribution groups might then increase 
cooperation because of their perceived social responsibility (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002). 
The larger the difference between the high and low endowed members in a hegemonic group, 
that is, the larger the inequality in the group, the more the high endowed members feel self-
efficacious and responsible for the group outcome. Parallel to what the BBV model suggests, 
this largely uneven distribution of wealth could change the sources of contribution. However, 
we would not predict a higher group contribution as the inequality of wealth increases 
because these high endowed members might be worried about being suckered as the level of 
inequality increases. Thus, although we expect that high endowed members in hegemonic 
distribution groups contribute more than those in symmetric heterogeneous groups because of 
the high self-efficacy and sense of responsibility, we are not sure if their contributions would 
be high enough to cover for the low endowed members. As a result, we hypothesize that: 
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H3: The overall contributions of groups with hegemonic distributions are going to 
decline less rapidly than those with symmetric distribution as the level of inequality increases. 
H4: Homogeneous groups cooperate more than heterogeneous groups with hegemonic 
distributions as well as those with symmetric distribution. 
For both types of distribution, the high endowed members own a large proportion of 
the group resources. Their contributions have great impact on the groups' payoffs. Thus, the 
different patterns of group contribution in the two types of distribution stated by H3 could 
probably be explained by the contributions ofhigh endowed members. We hypothesize that: 
H5: High endowed members in symmetric heterogeneous groups reduce their 
contribution as the inequality gets larger, and those in groups with hegemonic distribution 
reduce their contributions at a slower rate. 
Some previous studies on resource inequality investigated on the change of resource 
distribution after a PGD (e.g. Cowell, 1995; McCarter, Budescu, & Schreffmn，2010). We 
believed that the difference of decline rate ofhigh endowed members between the two types 
ofheterogeneous group in our study would also result in a different pattem of the change of 
resource distribution of the groups. If the high endowed members in a heterogeneous group 
contribute more and the low endowed members contribute less, then the resources of each 
member become more equal to each other than before. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H6: The resource redistribution of symmetric heterogeneous groups is going to slow 
down as the level of inequality increases, while the redistribution of groups with hegemonic 
distribution is steadier across the inequality levels in our paradigm. 
Method 
Overall design 
The design and the procedure of this experiment were very similar to Study 1, except 
that the heterogeneous configuration conditions were different, and that there were only 
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three-person groups. Instead of two types of configurations in Study 1, we had three types in 
this study: (1) homogeneous groups with equal endowments, (2) heterogeneous groups with 
symmetric distribution of high, medium and low endowments, and (3) groups with 
hegemonic distribution of high and low endowments. All conditions are listed in Table 5. 
Same as Study 1, our PG paradigm was a multiple-trial game with linear payoff 
function. However, unlike Study 1, which was framed as an investment game, this one was 
framed as a situation in which three group members contributed money for buying snacks 
that would be shared among them. Participants made decisions simultaneously and 
anonymously on how much to contribute in each trial. Each trial represented a condition 
described in Table 4. The conditions ofheterogeneous type and hegemonic type were 
separately randomized with the Latin Square technique. The order ofheterogeneous and 
hegemonic group configurations was counterbalanced. Each trial was made independent by 
assigning players different group members and different amounts of endowment in each trial. 
Manipulation check questions regarding perceived heterogeneity and hegemony in the group 
listed in Appendix D were asked right after the contribution decision was made. These 
questions were prompted to the participants in the first, the sixth and the last trials. 
Homogeneous Conditions 
Unlike Study 1，there was only one homogeneous condition in this experiment. All 
three members in the homogeneous group got an endowment of$30. This condition acted as 
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Symmetric Heterogeneous Conditions 
There were five endowment inequality conditions, from [25, 30，35] on the left of 
Table 5 to [5, 30，55] in the middle. They represented different levels of inequality measured 
by the GC, with higher GC indicating greater inequality of the group. All groups had the 
same endowment total of $90, and shared the $30 endowment as a medium level endowment 
in the group. We manipulated the magnitude of endowment variability across these 
conditions to get different GCs, but kept the distribution of the endowment the same across 
conditions. For example, the differences between the lowest and the medium, and the highest 
and the medium endowments in condition [5, 30，55] were both 25. Such configuration gave 
a GC of 0.37 according to Wassa's (2010) online Gini coefficient calculator, and a skewness 
ofzero, which meant that the endowment distribution was symmetric. We also made sure that 
our manipulations were strong enough by comparing them to previous studies. Our "very 
high" GC condition, [5, 30，55], had a GC of0.37 which was similar to Aquino et al.'s (1992) 
asymmetry condition. Also, our "high" GC condition [10, 30, 45] had a GC of 0.30，which 
was close to Cherry et al.'s (2005) heterogeneous condition. Therefore, we believed that our 
manipulations ofheterogeneity were strong enough to induce cooperation rate differences. 
Hegemonic Distribution Conditions 
The group configuration conditions for manipulating level of inequality in groups 
with hegemonic distribution were the [25, 25, 40] to [10, 10, 70] conditions in Table 5. These 
conditions also had the same group endowments and group sizes as the heterogeneous 
conditions. As a result, they were all comparable to each other. According to our definition of 
hegemonic distribution, hegemony in our conditions was created by putting a uniquely large 
endowment in the group, and making the rest of the endowments equal. This was the same 
design as Chan et al. (1996). The level of inequality represented by the GC of the groups 
increased as the high and low endowments became more extreme. For example, condition [10， 
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10, 70], which had the largest GC of 0.44 among the hegemonic distribution conditions, had a 
high endowment seven times larger than the low endowments. The GCs of our hegemonic 
distribution conditions were comparable to those of our symmetric heterogeneous conditions. 
For instance, both the hegemonic and the heterogeneous types of distribution had a condition 
with a GC of 0.22 (i.e. [20，20, 50] and [15，30，45]), and one condition of each type was 
close to 0.1 (i.e. [20, 30，40] and [25, 25, 40]), and another one close to 0.3 (i.e. [10, 30, 45] 
and [15, 15, 60]). Moreover, same as the symmetric heterogeneity conditions, we compared 
our manipulations with previous studies to make sure our manipulations were effective. The 
GC of our highest hegemonic condition, [10, 10, 70], was 0.44，which was higher than the 
highest variability condition of Chan et al.'s study. 
Participants and Design 
The experiment was a 3 (homogeneous vs. heterogeneous vs. hegemonic) 
configuration X 3 (high vs. medium vs. low) endowment status within-subject design. Like 
Study 1, this was not a full factorial design, because there was no high or low endowment 
status in homogeneous configurations. All conditions involved are listed in Table 4. 
Participants were 96 college students ofThe Chinese University o fHong Kong. They 
participated in the experiment that took approximately an hour either at an hourly rate of 
HKD50 (�USD6.42) or as a partial fulfillment of course credits. There were 24 participants 
in each session. Half of them were assigned to play in all the symmetric heterogeneous and 
homogeneous conditions first, while the other half played in all the hegemonic distribution 
conditions first. These two halves of participants never interacted with each other. Within 
each half, the 12 participants were grouped into four groups of three in each trial. 
Materials 
The materials used in this experiment were the same as those in Study 1, except that 
we added a manipulation check question for checking the perceived hegemonic effect: "in 
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this investment, there is one person in my group, including myself, possessing an extremely 
large amount of endowment relative to others". Participants responded by indicating that they 
1 = "strongly disagree" to 7 = "strongly agree" with the statement. This question was also 
translated into Chinese with back-translation. 
Procedure 
The procedure that took place in this study was also the same as Study 1, except that 
10 trials instead of 14 trials o fPG game were run. Also, since the values of endowment had 
changed, the payoff factor was changed from 2.5 to 2.2 to maintain the properties ofPGD. 
Results 
Definition of group level 
Since we are focusing on group contributions in this study, it is necessary to define 
the "group level" that we refer to in our analyses. We grouped our participants in three-
person groups. These groups, however, were not independent to each other, because their 
members were reassigned from the same 12 participants every trial. Therefore, a statistically 
independent unit involved all 12 participants of the four groups in each trial. This 
independent unit went through the 10 types of group configurations represented by the 10 
trials. As the 24 participants in each experiment session were divided into two 12-person 
units to play two sets of 10-trial games, in which these two units would never interact with 
each other, we had two units in each experiment session. We ran four experiment sessions 
and ended up with eight data points. Our group-level analyses reported in this study were 
conducted based on this definition of group. 
Generalized Estimating Equations 
As all eight group-level statistical units described above went through every level of 
inequality represented by the continuous variable, Gini coefficient, we used Generalized 
Estimating Equations (GEE) analysis to account for the dependency of our observations in 
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the analyses that have GC as an independent variable. GEE is an extension of the general 
linear model that is capable of analyzing non-independent data. It supports regression model 
with time series or correlated data (Garson, 2010). The correlation among observations of an 
individual across conditions was specified by using the exchangeable correlation working 
correlation matrix for the estimation of regression parameters (Hardin & Hilbe，2003). 
Manipulation check 
We manipulated perceived inequality by setting different endowment variability in 
each group configuration conditions. The level of inequality was represented by the GC. We 
asked the same manipulation check question as in Study 1 to check if they perceived as 
having endowments higher than or lower than others in the group (see Appendix D). We 
coded the smallest endowment value in a condition as "low" endowment, the medium value 
as "middle", and the largest value as "high" endowment. We expected and also confirmed by 
the GC by endowment status interaction effect found in the GEE analysis, Wald x ^ 2 , N= 39) 
=28.53 ,p < .001, and the post-hoc simple slope analysis (Aiken & West，1991), that "low" 
endowed positions reported having less than others as the GC got larger, p = -8.01，s.e.= 
1.91,jf? < .001; while "high" endowed positions reported having more than others as the 
coefficient became larger, p = 4.61，s.e. = 1.32，/? = .OOl.No significant change ofscore was 
anticipated or revealed for the "middle" endowed positions, f> = AO, s.e. = .81, n.s.. Thus, our 
participants were able to perceive different levels of inequality represented by the GC. This 
manipulation check result also addressed the problem of non-salient inequality manipulation 
we had in Study 1 by showing that the inequality in 3-person groups became more salient as 
we enlarged the variability among the three endowments. 
For hegemonic conditions, we manipulated the differences between the largest and the 
smallest endowments of a group. The level of inequality of these hegemonic conditions was 
again represented by the GC. Participants were asked to indicate on a seven-point scale 
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whether there was one person in their group, including themselves, possessing an extremely 
t 
large amount of endowment relative to others. We expected, and also confirmed by the main 
effect o f G C found in GEE analysis, Wald x^(l,A^= 16) = 35 .84 ,p< .001, that the larger the 
coefficient, the more they agreed that there was a particularly high endowed members in their 
groups. The insignificant GC by endowment status interaction, Wald %^(l,N= 16) = .94, n.s., 
indicated that the effect did not differ for the two types of endowment. 
Effect of Inequality in Symmetric Heterogeneous Groups 
Our first hypothesis stated that symmetric heterogeneous groups contributed less than 
the homogeneous groups. Moreover, we expected that the larger the inequality, the less the 
group contributed. In this analysis, we compared the homogeneous groups with the five 
symmetric heterogeneous groups by using repeated measure. Since the order of distribution 
type (i.e. heterogeneous and hegemonic groups) might have an effect on contribution, order 
was included in the analysis as a between-subject factor. The results showed that there was a 
main effect of inequality levels, F(5, 30) = 3.28,p = .018, r|p^ = .35, and no interaction effect 
between inequality level and order F(5, 30) = 1.73, n.s,, r|p^ = .22，meaning that there were 
contribution differences among these configurations, but whether participants played in 
heterogeneous groups or hegemonic groups first did not matter. Simple within-subject 
contrast between homogeneous and all five levels of inequality configuration showed that 
homogeneous group contributed significantly more {M= 16.05, SD = 2.57) than the second 
highest level, which had a GC of0.30 ( M = 13.87, SD = 3.45), F(1, 6) = 9.67,p = .021, r|p^ 
=.62, and the highest level ofheterogeneity ( M = 13.178, SD = 3.17), F(1, 6) = 21.40,p 
=.004，rip2 = .78，which had a GC of 0.37. This finding confirmed our first hypothesis which 
• 
stated that homogeneous groups cooperated more than their heterogeneous counterparts. The 
means and standard deviations of the contributions at each heterogeneity level and the results 
of pairwise comparisons were summarized in Table 5. • 
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Decline ofCooperation in Heterogeneous and Hegemonic Groups 
We then did a GEE analysis to test the second and the third hypotheses, which stated 
respectively that cooperation rate declined as the inequality (i.e. GC) of symmetrically 
heterogeneous groups increased; and that this decline was more gentle for hegemonic 
distribution groups. The results showed, as predicted, both a main effect of the GC, Wald 
X^(l,A^= 72) = 2>.lX,p = .05, and an interaction effect ofheterogeneous configuration and 
the GC on cooperation, Wald y ^ \ \ , N = 72) = 3.70,/? = .05. In general, our second hypothesis 
was confirmed. The larger the GC, which represented greater inequality of endowment 
distribution within groups, the less the group cooperated (see Figure 2). Simple slope analysis 
confirmed our third hypothesis by showing that cooperation ofhegemonic distribution groups 
actually did not change along with the increase of the GC, p = -2.39，s.e. = 3.07, n.s.. The 
decline of cooperation was mostly driven by symmetric heterogeneous groups, p = -8.83, s.e. 
3.63,p= .015. Symmetric heterogeneous groups cooperated more than hegemonic distributed 
groups when the inequality was small, but their cooperation rates declined as inequality 
increased, while the cooperation rates ofhegemonic groups remained unchanged across 
different levels of inequality. Although insignificant, the declining trend of the cooperation of 
symmetric heterogeneous groups went below the cooperation rates of the hegemonic 
distribution groups when the inequality approached to the higher level. 
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Fig. 2. Study 2: GEE predicted means ofgroup-level individual contribution in absolute value as a function of 
level ofinequality represented by Gini Coefficient and asymmetry of resource distribution. 
Homogeneous V5. Symmetric Heterogeneity and Hegemony 
As predicted by our forth hypothesis，which stated that homogeneous groups were 
more cooperative than the two types ofheterogeneous groups, repeated measure analysis 
showed that the group contributions were different among these three types of configuration, 
， 
F{2, 14) = 7.69,jo = .006，r|p = .52. Within-subject contrast further showed that homogeneous 
groups (M= 16.05, SD = 0.91) contributed significantly more than both the symmetric 
heterogeneous groups {M= 14.53, SD = 1.04)，F(1, 7) = 25.72,p = .001, r|p^ = .79, and the 
hegemonic distribution groups (M= 14.11, SD = 1.22), F(1, 7) = 9.95,p = .016, r|p^ = .59. 
Reasons of Different Decline Rates 
We tried to find out what caused such difference between hegemonic and 
heterogeneous groups. Our fifth hypothesis stated that the difference came from high ’ 
endowed members. That is, they contributed smaller proportions of their endowments as the _ 
inequality got larger when they were in symmetric heterogeneous groups, but such decline of 
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contribution was slower when they were in hegemonic distribution groups. Our hypothesis 
was supported by GEE analysis which tested the effect of distribution type and GC on the 
relative contribution from only high endowed members. As shown in Figure 3, it revealed a 
significant distribution type X GC interaction effect, Wald %^{l,N= 72) = 4.72,p = .030. 
Simple slope analysis showed that the percentage of endowment contributed from high 
endowed members dropped as the GC increased for symmetric heterogeneous groups, p = -
.71，s.e. = .18,p < .001, while it did not change for hegemonic distribution groups, f> = -.16, 
s.e. = .16, n.s.. From another perspective, we analyzed the contribution difference between 
the heterogeneous and the hegemonic distribution groups at specific points of the GC by 
following the procedure suggested by Aiken and West (1991). Since our lowest, highest and 
mean GC were .11, .37 and .25 respectively, these were the points we picked to do the 
analyses. When GC was small (i.e. .11), high endowed members in symmetric heterogeneous 
groups contributed more than when they were in hegemonic groups, p = .15，s.e. = .16,/? 
=.050. However, this difference became insignificant as the GC got larger towards the mean 
(i.e. .25), p = .02，s.e. = .03，n.s.. and towards the largest value in our design (i.e. .37), p = -
.05, s.e. = .04, n.s. 
As we could not rule out that the cooperation of the low endowed and the medium 
endowed members also decline the same way as the high endowed members, we explored 
whether contribution proportion changed across inequality levels for these two types of 
endowments. For low endowed members, we did the same GEE analysis that we did for high 
endowed members, except that we included only low endowment observations in this 
analysis. The insignificant interaction effect between group configuration and GC showed 
that the cooperation difference between the two configurations for high endowed members 
could not be found for low endowed members, Wald x^(l ,A^= 72) = .811, n.s.. For the 
medium endowed members, however, we could only analyze their behaviors in symmetric 
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heterogeneous groups, because there was no medium endowment position in hegemonic 
distribution groups. Nevertheless, if they also contributed proportionally less as the level of 
inequality increased, we could already confirm that they played a role in dragging down the 
cooperation rate in heterogeneous groups. We compared the contributions from the medium 
endowed members across the five inequality conditions with repeated measure. The result 
showed that there was no contribution difference among these heterogeneity levels, F(4, 28) 
=.396，n.s.. Therefore, we were confident that cooperation ofhigh endowed members was 
the deciding factor that led to a different trend of group contribution between symmetric 
heterogeneous and hegemonic distribution groups. 
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Fig. 3. Study 2: GEE predicted means of group-level high-endowed member contribution in percentage as a 
function of level of inequality represented by Gini Coefficient and asymmetry of resource distribution. 
Resource Redistribution in Heterogeneous and Hegemonic Groups 
Our sixth hypothesis stated that resource inequality in symmetric heterogeneous 
• 
groups would shrink more than in hegemonic distribution groups after a round of PG 
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contribution, especially when the inequality was small. In order to test this, we had to first 
calculate the GC of the payoff distributions of each group after a round of PG game the same 
way we did for the endowment distributions before the PG games. Then, we calculated the 
change of inequality, which we defined as the difference between the pre- and post-trial 
resource inequality (change of inequality = post-GC - pre-GC). Positive change of inequality 
meant that the resources in a group became more unequal after a trial; and negative change of 
inequality meant that the distribution became less unequal. The larger was the magnitude, the 
larger the change was between the pre- and post-game distribution inequality. With the 
change of inequality being the dependent variable, we did a GEE analysis to examine the 
effects of distribution type and GC. Confirming our hypothesis, the significant interaction 
effect, Wald ^^{l,N= 72) = AA5,p = .035, as shown in Figure 4，illustrated that resources in 
symmetric heterogeneous groups got redistributed more equally after the PG game than 
hegemonic distribution groups when the GC was small (i.e. .07), p = -.07，s.e. = .02,p = .007. 
Nevertheless, they did not redistribute resources any better than hegemonic distribution 
groups when the GC was at the mean (i.e. .25)，p = -.02, s.e. = .02, n.s., or at our highest Gini 
coefficient (i.e. .44)，p = .04，s.e. = .04, n.s.. 
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Fig. 4. Study 2: GEE predicted mean of the change of inequality as a function ofGini Coefficient and the 
asymmetry ofdistribution. At GC = .07, inequality in symmetric heterogeneous groups reduced significantly 
more than hegemonic distribution groups after the PG game (p = .07). 
Discussion 
Heterogeneity was confirmed to undermine group cooperative behaviors in general: 
the more uneven the resource distribution was, the lower the rate ofgroup cooperation. 
However, the difference between any two levels of inequality must be large enough to induce 
the behavioral difference. More importantly, we found thatjust by knowing the size of 
inequality was not enough to predict cooperative behaviors. It was critical to also consider the 
asymmetry of the distribution. In this study, we defined two types ofdistribution. They were 
the symmetric heterogeneous distribution, and the hegemonic distribution. We borrowed the 
Gini coefficient to describe the level pf inequality, and found that the declining trend of 
cooperation was mostly driven by the symmetric heterogeneous groups. At least in the GC 
f 
range we examined, cooperation rate remained quite constant for hegemonic distribution 
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groups as the GC increased. The different patterns of cooperation ofhigh endowed members 
in the two types of distribution were identified as an explanation. While their relative 
contribution dropped significantly in heterogeneous groups as the resources got more and 
more unequally distributed, it did not change in hegemonic groups. Because high endowed 
members were the most capable ones to influence the results of the group payoffs, as well as 
the distribution of resources after the PG game, inequality was more likely to be reduced after 
the contribution when distribution was symmetric heterogeneous than hegemonic. 
General Discussion 
We have identified two properties ofheterogeneity that have not been investigated 
together in previous studies. They are the level of inequality and the asymmetry ofresource 
distribution. Larger inequality does not always imply less cooperation. The decline emerges 
only when the distribution of resources is symmetric. When the distribution is asymmetric, or 
more specifically hegemonic, cooperation rate remains more or less unchanged across 
different levels of inequality. We are now able to explain the inconsistent findings from 
previous studies with the level of inequality and the type of distribution. As summarized in 
Table 1，most heterogeneous conditions in previous studies were symmetrically distributed, 
except those in Chan et al. (1996). The reason why some of them did not elicit cooperation 
change when compared with their homogeneous counterparts was because the level of 
inequality was not large enough. We could also explain why Chan et al. found a pattern of 
inequality effect that was different from all other studies. It was probably because the 
endowment distributions in their condition were asymmetric. Yet, we did not predict or find 
the same result as Chan et al.'s experiment because we were interested in independent 
observations for each type of configuration (a repeated one-shot game), while Chan et al.'s 
results were based on the aggregation of 15 observations of the unchanged groups for each 
type of configuration (a repeated game). These two types of game could bring different 
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effects on cooperative behaviors (Andreoni & Croson, 2008). Despite the unique findings of 
Chan et al., we believe that these two properties ofheterogeneity are essential in predicting 
cooperative behaviors ofheterogeneous groups in public goods dilemma. 
Psychological Factors 
Although we did not make predictions on how inequality and asymmetry influenced 
group members psychologically, we did measure fear, greed, self-efficacy, and the sense of 
responsibility for exploratory purpose by asking them four questions in the trials that contain 
also the manipulation questions. These questions are listed in Appendix E. All ofthem were 
translated into Chinese with back-translation. 
We analyzed the effects ofinequality and asymmetry on these measures separately for 
high endowed and low endowed observations. GEE analysis showed a main effect of 
inequality on self-efficacy, Wald x ' ( l ,A^= 116) = 10.51,p = .001, indicating that increasing 
inequality reduced self-efficacy of the low endowed members. All other effects were not 
significant on low endowed members. For high endowed observations, GEE analysis also 
find a main effect of inequality on the self-efficacy of the high endowed members, Wald x^(l, 
N= 84) = 7M,p = .005. The pattern of this result was opposite to that found on low 
endowed members. That is, high endowed members felt more self-efficacious as inequality 
increased. Moreover, we found an inequality X asymmetry interaction effect on fear with 
GEE analysis, Wald x\\,N= 84) = lM,p = .005. When the distribution was symmetric, 
high endowed members worried more about other members not contributing as inequality 
increased, p = 6.39，s.e. = 1.70,p < .001. But this worry decreased as inequality increased 
when the distribution was hegemonic, f> = -6.78，s.e. = 3.15,p = .031. All other effects were 
not significant on high endowed members. . 
The two main effects of inequality on the self-efficacies for the high and low endowed 
members make sense because larger inequality implies higher endowments for high endowed 
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positions and lower endowments for low endowed positions. There have been robust findings 
(e.g. van Dijk & Wilke，1994; Yu, Au, & Chan, 2009) that show higher endowments 
increases self-efficacy in PGD with continuous contributions. We were a bit puzzled, 
however, by the inequality X asymmetry interaction effect on fear. It was possible that this 
interaction effect was due to the wording of the question. Because we asked how "worried" 
they were about other members not contributing, the high endowed members in hegemonic 
distribution groups might actually became less worried and more certain that the low 
endowed members in the group were not going to contribute. It was also unexpected to us 
that inequality did not affect the greed motive for low endowed members and did not affect 
the sense of responsibility for high endowed members. Perhaps the context of our experiment 
undermined these two motives. In the experiment, the participants had to decide how much to 
contribute to the pool for buying snacks for the group. As snacks were not considered as 
necessity, if the participants imagined themselves making decisions in such situation, they 
might not think that they had the responsibility to provide the snacks even when they owed a 
large proportion of the group resources. Snacks were also not valuable food. They were 
probably not attractive enough to elicit the greed motives of the participants. 
Implication 
It is the easiest to look at the public goods dilemma in our study as paying tax by the 
citizens of a society. The main purpose of taxation is to raise money from the citizens and to 
pay it back to the society by building facilities for the public and by helping the people in 
need (Houghton, 1970). The taxation policies nowadays state very clearly how much the tax 
payers should pay and what punishment they get if they do not follow. Under such policies, 
the rich usually pays more than the poor, and the inequality of wealth could be reduced 
because of that. The findings of this study show that this might not be the case if paying tax 
was voluntary. In our public goods dilemma, group members have the right to decide how 
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much they want to contribute to the provision of the public goods. With this flexibility, the 
redistribution of income does not seem to be too efficient in some of the group configurations. 
In hegemonic distribution groups, inequality remains constant throughout the levels of 
inequality in our experiments. The decline of inequality also slows down as the level of 
inequality increases. The reason of such decline is due to the decrease of relative 
contributions from the rich people. Our results show that, the rich may well under-contribute 
ifproper taxation policy is not in place. Income inequality could, therefore, be hardly reduced, 
which carries negative impacts to the society on various issues (Comia, 2004). 
Our findings also contribute to social dilemma researches by highlighting the 
importance ofboth the composition and the distribution of endowments in a group. Not only 
do we explain the inconsistencies in previous PGD results on resource heterogeneity, we also 
introduce distribution asymmetry, which is a new perspective to look at the effect ofresource 
distribution on cooperation and resource redistribution. As illustrated by our data, 
cooperation rate and group inequality remain rather constant when resource distribution is 
hegemonic, while they decline quite significantly when the distribution is symmetric. This 
information is crucial for designing successful heterogeneity manipulation in PGD studies. 
Limitation and Further Study 
We realized that there were certain limitations in our design. One would be the rather 
small GC range and values. We have covered only the small inequality portion of the entire 
GC range. Therefore, we could not be certain how the pattem would go when the GC is 
beyond our range. By looking at Figure 2，if we assume that the relation continues to be 
linear, then the trend appears to be that as the level of inequality increases beyond the range, 
the resources in symmetric heterogeneous groups were getting less and less likely to be 
• 
redistributed. In fact, inequality could become even larger when the GC gets very large. 
Future study could include a larger and higher range of GC to test if this is the case. 
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We investigated distribution asymmetry in a discrete way in our study. We only had 
symmetric (skewness = 0) and hegemonic (absolute skewness > 0) distribution. It would be 
interesting to explore how the pattem of cooperation ofhegemonic distribution groups would 
change when the magnitude of skewness changes and when the distribution is skewed to low 
endowments. Future study could include larger group size or different ranges of endowment 
to allow more flexibility on manipulating skewness. It is possible that skewness is also a 
factor that affects the pattem of cooperation. The large skewness in Chan et al's (1995) 
experiment could be one of the factors that contributed to their findings of an increase of 
group cooperation as the level of inequality increased. 
One might question why we did not set up a factorial design in Study 2 to have the 
exact same set of inequality levels, that is, the same set of GCs in both the symmetric and 
hegemonic distribution conditions. Since the major goal of this study was to explain the 
inconsistent findings in previous studies，including Chan et al.'s, we tried to replicate their 
experimental design closely. Therefore, we followed Chan et al. to used three-person groups. 
With such a small group size, it was impossible to design both a symmetric distribution 
condition and a hegemonic distribution condition with the same level of inequality and group 
endowment while keeping the individual endowments make sense. For example when GC 
equals 0.44 in the hegemonic distribution condition, a group with a symmetric distribution 
that has a closest inequality would be [1, 30, 59], which has a GC of0.43. However, such 
design would allow no variability of contribution for the low endowed member. The 
constraints ofgroup size and group endowment could certainly be relaxed in future studies in 
order to allow a balanced factorial design with more flexible groups. For instance, we could 
set up group [5, 15, 100，185, 195] for symmetric distribution and [45, 45, 45, 45, 320] for 
hegemonic distribution, so that both groups have an endowment of500 and a GC of0.44. 
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Conclusion 
We have identified two properties ofheterogeneity in this study. They are the level of 
inequality and the asymmetry of resource distribution. We have found that group cooperation, 
as well as the contributions ofhigh endowed players decrease as the level ofheterogeneity 
increases. However, this effect can only be found in heterogeneous groups which resources 
are distributed symmetrically, and not in groups with hegemonic distribution ofresources. 
When the level of inequality is small, the inequality of a group gets reduced more efficiently 
when the distribution is symmetric, than when it is hegemonic. These two properties of 
heterogeneity explain the inconsistent findings in previous studies. They also shed light on 
future PGD studies on group composition and resource distribution. 
* 
t 
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Appendix E 
Public Goods Dilemma 
Public goods (PG) are products or services which availabilities depend on the 
collective effort of the group. Once provisioned, PG is non-rival and non-excludable to the 
group members (Olson, 1965). That is, one member consuming the goods does not reduce the 
availability ofthe goods to others, and it is impossible to exclude anyone in the group from 
consuming them. The non-excludability property o fPG creates the temptation for the 
members to free ride (Buchanan 1968; Olson 1965), because one always generates maximum 
benefit by not contributing to the provision of the PG when others do. But if no one 
contributes, PG will not be provisioned. In such situation, neither personal nor group benefit 
is maximized. Therefore, group members face a dilemma, in which they have to decide 
whether they want to cooperate or not. We are all facing PGD in our daily lives probably 
without noticing it. When we are considering whether to donate blood to the blood bank, or 
money to charity, for example, we know that the more people donating makes better PG, 
which are the blood bank and the charity foundation. On the other hand, we probably also 
think that we are not the only people who contribute in these donations. More importantly, 
we may still be getting the blood when we need it, or seeing the charity helping the people we 
hope to help without us actually making any donation. In these cases, we are struggling 
between self-interest and collective benefit. 
Public goods dilemmas are usually studied by simulating the situations in 
experimental paradigms. Various paradigms have been developed in previous studies (see 
Kollock, 1998; Komorita & Chen, 1994; Ledyard & Palfrey，1995; Ostrom, 1998; Van De 
Kragt, Orbell & Dawes, 1983). The designs of these paradigms can be summarized with three 
properties: (1) protocol of play, (2) payoff condition, and (3) contribution method. The 
paradigms usually differ from each other by having different combinations ofthese properties. 
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Most studies are based on simultaneous protocol of play (e.g. Pillutla & Chen，1999; 
Kerr & Kaufman-Gimiand，1994; Van De Kragt, Orbell & Dawes, 1983; Van Dijk & Wilke, 
2000). Recently, however, there have been increasing focus being put on sequential protocol 
of play (e.g. Au, 2004; Chen, Au, & Kormorita, 1996; Chen & Bachrach, 2003; Suleiman, 
Budescu & Rapoport，2001). Players in a simultaneous paradigm make contribution decisions 
at the same time. They do not receive feedback of the outcome until all members of the group 
have made their decisions. Players in a sequential paradigm, on the other hand, make 
contributions in a sequential order. This allows the flexibility ofrevealing the most updated 
group cooperation status including the payoff status. Payoffs are calculated based on 
predetermined functions which can be categorized into step-level or continuous. With step-
level function, PG is provisioned only if the total number of contributions or the total amount 
ofcontribution has reached a certain predefined provision point. Abundant researches have 
been conducted with step-level paradigms (e.g. Au, 2004; Chen, Au, & Kormorita, 1996; 
Erev & Rapoport, 1990; Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994, Van De Kragt, Orbell & Dawes, 
1983; Wit & Wilke, 1998). With linear function, the value o f the PG increases linearly with 
the contributions (see Chen & Bachrach, 2003; de Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002; Pillutla & Chen, 
1999). Players in a step-level PG game is less likely to be certain whether their contributions 
will make a difference, especially with simultaneous protocol ofplay, while players in a 
linear PG game always know that their contributions count. Another paradigm property that 
relates to the amount of contribution even more directly is the contribution method. All-or-
none, or binary contribution method limits players to choose between contributing or not. 
Continuous contribution method, on the other hand, allows players to decide on the amount, 
ranging from zero to the maximum of their endowment, to contribute. • 
• 
• 
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Appendix E 
Cost-and-Benefit 
Ledyard (1995) listed five experimental papers in his review that showed that 
heterogeneity of resources tended to decrease contributions, supporting Marwell and Ames， 
arguments. Along the same line, Rapoport, Bomstin, and Erev (1989) found that people with 
more resources were less likely to contribute than those with fewer resources in a step-level 
PG game with all-or-none contribution and step-level payoff. They suggested that this was an 
evidence of the cost-to-benefit ratio dominating the effect of criticality (Rapoport, 1988). 
They argued that it was more costly for those with more resources to contribute their entire 
endowment than those with fewer resources. Nevertheless, the factor of cost-to-benefit ratio 
that reduces contribution in the all-or-none contribution paradigms plays somewhat a 
reversed role in continuous contribution paradigm. There have been robust findings that the 
absolute amount contributed by higher endowed positions is larger than lower endowed 
positions when group members are allowed to decide how much to contribute (Van Dijk & 
Wilke, 1994, 1995; Van Dijk et al.，1999; Wit et al., 1992). One of the explanations has been 
that the cost to contribute one unit is lower for higher endowed members than for the lower 
endowed members (Wit et al., 1992). 
Coordination Rule 
Another explanation is the coordination rule, which has been referred to by many 
heterogeneous PGD studies. For instance, Van Dijk & Wilke (1995) argued that although 
people in homogeneous PGD adhered to the equal final outcome rule, and were expecting an 
equal final outcome (Allison & Messick, 1990; Allison, McQueen, & Schaerfl，1992), when 
they were in heterogeneous PGD, they anchored to proportionality rule, and were expecting 
members with more resources to end up having a higher proportion ofoutcome. 
Proportionality rule states that group members find it fair when the amount ofcontribution is 
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proportional to one's endowment, while equal final outcome rule says that it is fair when 
everyone in the group possesses an equal amount at the end. The major reason that 
proportionality rule was more preferred in heterogeneous PGD, as suggested and shown by 
Van Dijk & Wilke (1995), was because it satisfied the norm offaimess in that situation. 
Fairness 
Members in a group adhere to the norm of faimess because these behaviors are agreed 
to be fair; and they are both accepted and expected (Cialdini, Bator, & Guadagno, 1999). It is 
not only the fairness perception of own contribution that affects cooperation, the faimess 
perception of the reward allocation rule in heterogeneous PGD is also proposed as an 
explanation that influence one's contribution. Aquino et al. (1992) argued that the 
heterogeneous distribution of resources led to a perception ofunfaimess on the equal 
distribution ofrewards in PGD. The reason being that equal division ofrewards deviated 
from the principle of equity (Adams, 1963) as the inequality ofresources increased. The 
unfair feeling then resulted in a decrease of contributions from the high endowed group 
members. In fact, they found a negative correlation between resource inequality and faimess 
ofallocation rule. However, they failed to see any behavioral differences induced by this 
perceived unfairness. As pointed out by Van Dijk and Grodzka (1992), people do not make 
decision relying only on the faimess motive. 
Fear and Greed 
Ifall people in heterogeneous dilemma make contributions according to the 
proportionality rule, we should be able to predict their contributions perfectly based on their 
endowments. The fact is，however, higher endowed people contribute proportionally less than 
lower endowed people (Buckley & Croson, 2006). Moreover, the percentage ofcontribution 
» 
by higher endowed people are also less than predicted by economic theories, while the 
percentage ofcontribution by lower endowed people are higher than predicted (Chan et al., 
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1996; Ledyard, 1995). Fear and greed are two of the major motives ofdefection in PGD in 
general. They are also known as the sucker effect and the free-rider problems, and have been 
shown to hold people back from cooperation in homogeneous PGD (Komorita & Parks, 1995; 
Yamagishi & Sato，1986). While greed refers to the desire offree-riding on others' efforts, 
fear includes the fear of the contributed resources being wasted (e.g. Dawes, Orbell, 
Simmons, & Van De Kragt, 1986; Rapoport & Eshed-Levy，1989), and the fear ofbeing 
suckered (e.g. Coombs, 1973; Kerr, 1983). Researches on these two effects find that both 
factors play an important role of inducing defection, with some suggesting that fear accounts 
for most o f the defection (Brubaker,1975), while some showing that greed is the bigger 
reason (Kerr, 1983). Aquino et al. (1992) proposed that these motives became even more 
salient to the higher endowed and lower endowed members in heterogeneous PGD. They 
argued that members with fewer resources felt more dispensable with their contributions 
compared to the higher endowed members (Kerr, 1983). They also had greater gain by 
defecting based on rational-choice model (Olson, 1965). Therefore，the desire to free-ride 
would be salient for low endowed people. On the other hand, members with more resources 
realized that it was very unlikely that the PG could be provisioned without their contributions. 
In fact, they could be losing their resources by contributing if everyone else defected. Thus, 
the fear ofbeing suckered would be salient for high endowed members. As what they 
predicted, when resource inequality was high, the desire to free-ride was stronger for lower 
endowment positions, and the concern ofbeing suckered was stronger for higher endowment 
positions. Both effects were significantly weaker when resource distribution was more even. 
Although fear and greed are very consistently found to be undermining cooperation, 
they do not extinguish cooperation as the expected utility and rational-choice models have 
predicted (Weber, Kopelman, & Messick，2004). This is because psychological factors, such 
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as self-efficacy and responsibility are also involved in social dilemmas, and they have robust 
effects on enhancing cooperation. 
Self-efficacy and Responsibility 
Plenty ofstudies have been conducted on public goods dilemma to investigate one's 
perceived self-efficacy, but most of them targeted homogeneous groups. Kerr (1989) found 
that people saw themselves being more efficacious in the provision of the PG in a small 
group than in a large group. He also argued that increasing the weight ofcontribution fostered 
one's self-efficacy (Kerr, 1992), which in turn led to larger contribution. This was supported 
by some recent studies by Au and Chung (2007) and Yu, Au, and Chan (2009). While self-
efficacy was about one's perceived power of affecting the result, social responsibility was 
one's perception ofothers' needs ofhis/her contribution ofeffort. De Cremer and Van Dijk 
(2002) suggested that cooperation could be fostered by activating one's social responsibility. 
They found that when people felt responsible to contribute for the collective welfare, they 
were more likely to cooperate. Although these are all findings from homogeneous group 
studies, there are evidences showing that resource distribution could be a factor that changes 
the effects ofself-efficacy and responsibility. Kerr (1992), for example, has suggested that 
perceived self-efficacy of the contribution is higher for members with high endowments 
relative to other group members. The sense of responsibility of the group benefit is also 
greater when all other members have significantly less resources (Van Dijk & Grodzka, 
1992). Thus, we can see that both factors have a larger effect on cooperation for people who 
have relatively more resources. 
We have discussed quite a few elements that influence one's cooperation in 
heterogeneous groups in PGD. Explanations such as cost-and-benefit, coordination rules, and 
» 
perceived fairness give more general suggestions on what people consider when members in 
the group have unequal amount of resources, whereas factors like fear, greed, .self-efficacy, 
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and social responsibility affect members with different endowment statuses differently. While 
self-efficacy, social responsibility, and fear ofbeing suckered enhance cooperation ofhigh 
endowed individuals, free-ride temptation undermines cooperation of low endowed people. 
•1 
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Appendix C 
Group size 
We did not find the expected cooperation difference between our [20, 30, 40] 
heterogeneous and [30, 30, 30] homogeneous conditions. When we further analyzed for all 
three-person groups condition with repeated measure, we also could not find the 
heterogeneity configuration X order effect that we found in our four-person group conditions, 
both in terms of absolute value, F(1, 70) = .09, n.s., or proportion ofcontribution, F(1, 70) 
=.07，n.s.. There was also no significant main effect of group configuration on absolute 
contribution value, F(1, 70) = .90，n.s., or proportion ofcontribution, F(1, 70) = 2.69, n.s.. 
Therefore, we could not draw any conclusion about whether homogeneous groups would 
contribute more than heterogeneous groups when group endowments were hold constant 
among conditions. Nevertheless, these results were not totally surprising because the analyses 
for the manipulation check had revealed that the perceived heterogeneity for 3-person group 
might not be salient enough. When referring back to the degree ofheterogeneity in other 
studies that we have reviewed (see Table 1), our [20, 30，40] condition has a Gini coefficient 
of around 0.15，while Cherry et al.'s four-person [10, 20, 30, 40] condition has a Gini 
coefficient of0.25. Gini coefficient of 0.25 is also the lowest Gini coefficient among the 
experimental conditions o f the studies we have examined that could elicit a cooperation rate 
difference between heterogeneous and homogeneous groups. Chan et al.'s (1996) [15,15, 30] 
condition, which Gini coefficient is 0.17, confirms our explanation as they also could not find 
any difference in cooperation rate between this condition and their [20, 20, 20] homogeneous 
condition. In Study 2，we made sure we had heterogeneous conditions with Gini coefficients 
that were larger than 0.25 to ensure successful heterogeneity manipulation. 
摯 
Order ofgroup size arrangement ‘ 
• 
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We found unexpected group size arrangement order effect in our four-person groups. 
We believed that players might feel fatigue and have established strategies as the trials went 
on. These could be two of the factors that contributed to the order effect in this study. Our 
participants played altogether 16 trials o fPG game including the two practice trials. There 
were very little variations among these trials, because there were only four types of 
endowment (i.e. 10，20, 30，40), two types of group size (i.e. three and four), which changed 
only once throughout the trials; and two types of endowment distribution (i.e. all the same 
and a little uneven). Since the trials looked more or less the same, the participants might start 
losing their excitements, and might also have established certain strategies after the first 
several trials. By the time the group size changed, around ha l fof the number oftrials had 
passed. Although their awareness of resource distribution did not decline, as there was no 
order effect on manipulation check for four-person heterogeneous groups, F(1, 44) = .212, 
n.s., they might already be relying less on this information in making their decisions. 
In Study 2, we are interested in three-person groups only. Therefore, we would not have the 
same group size arrangement order effect. Also, for the purpose oflooking into different 
degrees ofheterogeneity, we had to have a much larger variety of endowments,which should 
make the trials look more different from each other. Taking the experience from this study, 
we minimize boredom by reducing the number of trials, and limiting each condition to appear 
only once to the participants. In order to draw more attention from our participants on the 
endowment distribution in their groups, and make this information more relevant to their 
decisions, we used a more social and mundane context by framing the decision as buying 
snacks for sharing within the group. We also increased the incentive to selecting two, instead 
ofone participant in the end-of-experiment lucky draw to receive the monetary bonus. 
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Appendix D 
Manipulation Checks 
1. In this investment, how much is your endowment different from others in your group? 
(1 — much less than others; 7 - much more than others) 
2. In this investment, there is one person in my group, including myself, possessing an 




Effect of Inequality on Cooperation 66 
Appendix E 
Measure of the Desire to Free-ride 
1. In this investment, I want to invest as little as I could. (1 - strongly disagree; 7 -
strongly agree) 
Measure of Sucker Effect 
2. In this investment, I am worried that other people would invest very little. (1 - strongly 
disagree; 7 — strongly agree) 
Measure of Self-efficacy 
3. In this investment, I think my investment will be sufficient to make the group bonus 
satisfactory. (1 - strongly disagree; 7 - strongly agree) 
Measure of Responsibility 
4. In this investment, I think I have the responsibility to invest for the welfare of the group. 





CUMK L1brar1fli m i i i ^ 
004779525 
